The need to apply the Vetting Principle in peace processes: Colombian case in the normative implementation of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace

Abstract

The main argument to sustain in this paper is that the no application of the Vetting Principle has obstructed the peacebuilding in Colombia due to the performance of vetting agents that had kept from an integral accountability process for international crimes to take place, as well as the political reinstatement process for ex-combatants. The consequences of the no application of the Vetting Principle will be exposed through the following conceptual devices that expose the severe interferences against the right to peace as an international duty of the State: structural violence, punitive populism, macro criminality, and low political participation. The article will be structured in three sections: (i) vetting agents interferences in the legal and normative implementation of Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) (ii) transformations and modifications in the JEP design, analyzed from the Vetting Principle angle, and (iii) consequences of these transformations as obstacles for peacebuilding.